1 00:00:03,002 --> 00:00:04,738 NARRATOR: After losing their electric generators-- 2 00:00:04,804 --> 00:00:07,040 OK, beacons off. 3 00:00:07,107 --> 00:00:10,009 NARRATOR: The pilots of Air Illinois flight 710 4 00:00:10,076 --> 00:00:12,445 shut down one system after another 5 00:00:12,512 --> 00:00:14,948 to conserve their battery power. 6 00:00:15,014 --> 00:00:18,885 It was probably the most sickening 7 00:00:18,952 --> 00:00:21,321 feeling for both of them. 8 00:00:21,388 --> 00:00:23,390 NARRATOR: But efforts proved futile. 9 00:00:26,960 --> 00:00:30,597 All the passengers and crew are killed. 10 00:00:30,663 --> 00:00:34,501 NTSB investigators examine the plane's electrical components 11 00:00:34,567 --> 00:00:35,502 for clues. 12 00:00:35,568 --> 00:00:37,637 There was no short circuit. 13 00:00:37,704 --> 00:00:40,306 What about the batteries? 14 00:00:40,373 --> 00:00:42,809 No signs of arcing. 15 00:00:42,876 --> 00:00:44,778 NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recording 16 00:00:44,844 --> 00:00:46,546 raises more questions. 17 00:00:46,613 --> 00:00:48,815 Are you using these lights here? 18 00:00:48,882 --> 00:00:50,450 I'll get that one down. 19 00:00:50,517 --> 00:00:52,352 Well, they're doing the right thing, turning 20 00:00:52,419 --> 00:00:53,720 things off to reduce the load. 21 00:00:53,787 --> 00:00:55,789 So what happened? 22 00:00:55,855 --> 00:00:57,457 You got a flashlight? 23 00:00:57,524 --> 00:00:58,691 Yep. 24 00:00:59,793 --> 00:01:01,027 CREW (ON RADIO): Mayday, mayday. 25 00:01:25,585 --> 00:01:27,787 NARRATOR: Air Illinois flight 710 26 00:01:27,854 --> 00:01:30,757 departs from capital airport in Springfield, Illinois. 27 00:01:35,829 --> 00:01:37,730 Gear up. 28 00:01:37,797 --> 00:01:41,367 NARRATOR: 32-year-old Captain Lester Smith has been with Air 29 00:01:41,434 --> 00:01:42,836 Illinois almost five years. 30 00:01:45,472 --> 00:01:48,741 He's one of its most experienced pilots. 31 00:01:48,808 --> 00:01:50,543 Gear is up. 32 00:01:50,610 --> 00:01:53,079 NARRATOR: First Officer Frank Tudor has been with the airline 33 00:01:53,146 --> 00:01:56,416 for three years. 34 00:01:56,483 --> 00:01:58,852 He's considered one of its top first officers. 35 00:02:02,121 --> 00:02:05,058 1,000 feet. 36 00:02:05,124 --> 00:02:09,462 The pilots are flying a Hawker Siddeley 748. 37 00:02:09,529 --> 00:02:13,967 The rugged turboprop is designed to land on shorter runways. 38 00:02:14,033 --> 00:02:16,402 DAVE MINTY: These Hawker Siddeley 748 39 00:02:16,469 --> 00:02:21,107 was one of a number of aircraft built to replace the DC3 40 00:02:21,174 --> 00:02:25,945 as a commuter slash cargo slash military-type aircraft 41 00:02:26,012 --> 00:02:29,916 but primarily used as a commuter aircraft. 42 00:02:29,983 --> 00:02:32,986 NARRATOR: It's the ideal plane for a regional airline 43 00:02:33,052 --> 00:02:38,024 that connects big cities to small towns in Illinois. 44 00:02:38,091 --> 00:02:40,793 Illinois 710, radar identified. 45 00:02:40,860 --> 00:02:43,763 Continue to 3,000 feet, clear to Carbondale. 46 00:02:43,830 --> 00:02:46,966 TUDOR: Illinois 710, 3,000 feet cleared for Carbondale. 47 00:02:47,033 --> 00:02:49,802 Thank you and good night. 48 00:02:49,869 --> 00:03:00,680 Heading 175. 49 00:03:00,747 --> 00:03:03,716 NARRATOR: Less than two minutes after takeoff-- 50 00:03:03,783 --> 00:03:05,885 It's the generator again. 51 00:03:05,952 --> 00:03:10,590 NARRATOR: A generator warning light comes on. 52 00:03:10,657 --> 00:03:13,760 The aircraft is equipped with two nine-kilowatt generators 53 00:03:13,826 --> 00:03:18,865 that supply power to the battery banks and electrical systems. 54 00:03:18,932 --> 00:03:22,101 One of the generators has failed. 55 00:03:22,168 --> 00:03:25,204 Isolating it now. 56 00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:28,174 NARRATOR: The first officer disconnects the right generator 57 00:03:28,241 --> 00:03:30,843 to protect the rest of the aircraft's electrical system. 58 00:03:33,179 --> 00:03:34,614 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: When something like this 59 00:03:34,681 --> 00:03:37,250 happens and you have a generator failure, 60 00:03:37,317 --> 00:03:39,185 one of the most important steps is 61 00:03:39,252 --> 00:03:42,755 to disconnect that generator from the system 62 00:03:42,822 --> 00:03:46,192 as quickly as possible. 63 00:03:46,259 --> 00:03:48,962 Jeanene Urban is a former Air Illinois 64 00:03:49,028 --> 00:03:51,097 pilot who landed the pain in Springfield 65 00:03:51,164 --> 00:03:54,033 three hours earlier. 66 00:03:54,100 --> 00:03:56,502 JEANENE URBAN: The generators are each 67 00:03:56,569 --> 00:04:01,608 rated to be able to carry the entire load, 68 00:04:01,674 --> 00:04:04,677 so if one generator goes down, you can 69 00:04:04,744 --> 00:04:07,246 continue to your destination. 70 00:04:07,313 --> 00:04:10,516 It is not an emergency. 71 00:04:10,583 --> 00:04:12,218 NARRATOR: Tonight's 40-minute flight 72 00:04:12,285 --> 00:04:16,556 is taking seven passengers 146 miles from Springfield 73 00:04:16,623 --> 00:04:17,724 to Carbondale, Illinois. 74 00:04:20,860 --> 00:04:24,597 Springfield, Illinois 710, we've experienced 75 00:04:24,664 --> 00:04:26,599 a slight electrical problem. 76 00:04:26,666 --> 00:04:28,301 We'll keep you advised. 77 00:04:28,368 --> 00:04:31,738 Illinois 710, do you intend to return to Springfield. 78 00:04:31,804 --> 00:04:32,939 SMITH: Negative. 79 00:04:33,006 --> 00:04:36,809 Continuing to Carbondale, 3,000 feet. 80 00:04:36,876 --> 00:04:38,578 NARRATOR: The captain decides it's 81 00:04:38,645 --> 00:04:40,680 safe to continue the flight. 82 00:04:40,747 --> 00:04:43,182 I understand you are continuing to Carbondale. 83 00:04:43,249 --> 00:04:44,083 Roger. 84 00:04:47,286 --> 00:04:51,124 NARRATOR: There's dense cloud cover this evening. 85 00:04:51,190 --> 00:04:53,693 JEANENE URBAN: The conditions at Carbondale 86 00:04:53,760 --> 00:04:56,963 were what is called IFR, instrument flight rules. 87 00:04:57,030 --> 00:04:59,699 They would have been operating in the clouds, 88 00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:04,570 needed their instruments to be able to fly the airplane. 89 00:05:04,637 --> 00:05:07,006 DAVE MINTY: They were flying into deteriorating weather 90 00:05:07,073 --> 00:05:08,274 conditions. 91 00:05:08,341 --> 00:05:09,942 It's something that every airline pilot 92 00:05:10,009 --> 00:05:12,045 is trained to handle, but it doesn't 93 00:05:12,111 --> 00:05:13,179 give you much room for error. 94 00:05:16,783 --> 00:05:19,085 NARRATOR: Four minutes after takeoff, 95 00:05:19,152 --> 00:05:23,022 the first officer checks the status of the generators. 96 00:05:23,089 --> 00:05:26,092 Zero voltage in amps on the left side. 97 00:05:26,159 --> 00:05:29,862 NARRATOR: He discovers that the left generator is dead. 98 00:05:29,929 --> 00:05:33,766 TUDOR: The right generator's putting out 27.5 volts. 99 00:05:33,833 --> 00:05:37,303 NARRATOR: The right generator now appears to be working, 100 00:05:37,370 --> 00:05:39,672 but the first officer is unable to reconnect 101 00:05:39,739 --> 00:05:41,074 it to the electrical system. 102 00:05:41,140 --> 00:05:43,076 Can't get it to come online. 103 00:05:43,142 --> 00:05:47,380 NARRATOR: The right generator is as good as dead. 104 00:05:47,447 --> 00:05:49,649 DAVE MINTY: With both generators out, 105 00:05:49,716 --> 00:05:51,984 all the systems are feeding off the batteries 106 00:05:52,051 --> 00:05:54,120 instead of the generators. 107 00:05:54,187 --> 00:05:55,388 It's not a good situation. 108 00:05:58,191 --> 00:06:02,261 NARRATOR: The aircraft has four nickel cadmium batteries. 109 00:06:02,328 --> 00:06:04,831 With no generators, the batteries 110 00:06:04,897 --> 00:06:07,266 are now powering lights, instruments, 111 00:06:07,333 --> 00:06:09,202 navigational equipment, and everything 112 00:06:09,268 --> 00:06:10,269 in the passenger cabin. 113 00:06:15,441 --> 00:06:19,112 How were the bats there? 114 00:06:19,178 --> 00:06:21,948 We're down to 22.5 volts. 115 00:06:22,014 --> 00:06:24,817 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: So now that we're operating on only battery 116 00:06:24,884 --> 00:06:28,755 power, the primary problem is that the batteries are only 117 00:06:28,821 --> 00:06:32,225 designed to operate for about 30 minutes 118 00:06:32,291 --> 00:06:35,795 under the best case scenario. 119 00:06:35,862 --> 00:06:41,367 NARRATOR: Illinois 710 is now 32 minutes from its destination. 120 00:06:41,434 --> 00:06:45,171 If they don't reduce the drain on the batteries, 121 00:06:45,238 --> 00:06:48,174 it will be almost impossible to land without lights, 122 00:06:48,241 --> 00:06:51,878 instruments, or a radio. 123 00:06:51,944 --> 00:06:54,814 OK, beacons off. 124 00:06:54,881 --> 00:06:57,884 OK. 125 00:06:57,950 --> 00:07:00,820 SMITH: Nav lights are off. 126 00:07:00,887 --> 00:07:03,089 Are you using these lights here? 127 00:07:03,156 --> 00:07:05,024 I'll get that one down. 128 00:07:08,060 --> 00:07:12,932 NARRATOR: The pilots quickly shut down nonessential systems. 129 00:07:12,999 --> 00:07:16,068 JEANENE URBAN: The sooner they start shutting things down, 130 00:07:16,135 --> 00:07:19,839 the longer the battery is going to last. 131 00:07:19,906 --> 00:07:22,008 How are the batteries? 132 00:07:22,074 --> 00:07:24,010 Pretty good. 133 00:07:24,076 --> 00:07:26,746 We're at 21.5. 134 00:07:26,813 --> 00:07:28,748 NARRATOR: The efforts to conserve battery 135 00:07:28,815 --> 00:07:31,951 power seem to be paying off. 136 00:07:32,018 --> 00:07:34,720 Should last to Carbondale. 137 00:07:34,787 --> 00:07:35,421 Yeah. 138 00:07:38,424 --> 00:07:41,294 NARRATOR: Midway to their destination, 139 00:07:41,360 --> 00:07:43,763 the weather deteriorates. 140 00:07:45,364 --> 00:07:48,501 JEANENE URBAN: The weather that Frank and Les encountered 141 00:07:48,568 --> 00:07:50,403 trying to get down to Carbondale was 142 00:07:50,469 --> 00:07:53,139 much stormier than Springfield. 143 00:07:53,206 --> 00:07:58,744 There were level two and three thunderstorms. 144 00:07:58,811 --> 00:08:00,980 Want me to tune in to cabby real quick? 145 00:08:01,047 --> 00:08:02,014 Sure. 146 00:08:02,081 --> 00:08:03,182 Not gonna use that much power. 147 00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:08,888 NARRATOR: 45 miles from Carbondale, the crew 148 00:08:08,955 --> 00:08:11,390 tunes into a signal that will provide a precise bearing 149 00:08:11,457 --> 00:08:12,291 to the airport. 150 00:08:15,995 --> 00:08:18,297 Meanwhile, air traffic control transfers 151 00:08:18,364 --> 00:08:19,966 the flight to the approach frequency 152 00:08:20,032 --> 00:08:23,169 for Southern Illinois. 153 00:08:23,236 --> 00:08:26,038 Air Illinois flight 710, contact Kansas 154 00:08:26,105 --> 00:08:29,475 City center on frequency 125.3. 155 00:08:29,542 --> 00:08:31,277 25.3, Roger. 156 00:08:31,344 --> 00:08:35,948 Air Illinois 710. 157 00:08:36,015 --> 00:08:38,951 They were getting close to the airport, 158 00:08:39,018 --> 00:08:42,355 and that approach control facility would have lined them 159 00:08:42,421 --> 00:08:46,425 up for an instrument approach. 160 00:08:46,492 --> 00:08:50,162 NARRATOR: After contacting approach control, 161 00:08:50,229 --> 00:08:53,165 the situation worsens. 162 00:08:53,232 --> 00:08:56,402 I don't know if we have enough juice to get out of this. 163 00:08:56,469 --> 00:08:59,272 NARRATOR: The radios and transponder on flight 710 164 00:08:59,338 --> 00:09:00,172 have shut down. 165 00:09:03,075 --> 00:09:04,977 The pilots are now on their own. 166 00:09:08,247 --> 00:09:11,918 Illinois 710, I've lost radar contact. 167 00:09:11,984 --> 00:09:14,320 NARRATOR: Flight 710 has disappeared from air 168 00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:16,188 traffic control's radar. 169 00:09:16,255 --> 00:09:19,959 Illinois 710, Kansas City. 170 00:09:20,026 --> 00:09:26,265 They had no capability at this point to like help. 171 00:09:26,332 --> 00:09:30,002 It was probably the most sickening 172 00:09:30,069 --> 00:09:35,374 feeling for both of them that you or I could imagine. 173 00:09:35,441 --> 00:09:37,143 Watch my altitude. 174 00:09:37,209 --> 00:09:40,579 Going down to 2,400 feet. 175 00:09:40,646 --> 00:09:44,417 NARRATOR: Concerned their instruments are about to fail, 176 00:09:44,483 --> 00:09:49,088 the captain attempts to get below the clouds. 177 00:09:49,155 --> 00:09:50,957 JEANENE URBAN: He was desperately 178 00:09:51,023 --> 00:09:53,559 hoping that he could see the airport 179 00:09:53,626 --> 00:09:58,297 beacon or some runway lights and land that airplane visually. 180 00:09:58,364 --> 00:10:02,435 DAVE MINTY: Just eight minutes from landing-- 181 00:10:02,501 --> 00:10:03,602 SMITH: You got a flashlight? 182 00:10:03,669 --> 00:10:05,104 Yeah. 183 00:10:05,171 --> 00:10:07,239 NARRATOR: The batteries are almost depleted. 184 00:10:07,306 --> 00:10:08,274 Here we go. 185 00:10:08,341 --> 00:10:10,009 You want to shine it up here. 186 00:10:10,076 --> 00:10:12,945 Trying to illuminate the instruments with a flashlight 187 00:10:13,012 --> 00:10:17,216 in a dark cockpit, that is very abnormal, 188 00:10:17,283 --> 00:10:19,352 and is he pointing it at an instrument that's functioning 189 00:10:19,418 --> 00:10:21,654 or one that's not? 190 00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:26,058 We're losing everything down to 13 volts. 191 00:10:26,125 --> 00:10:28,194 Watch my altitude, Frank. 192 00:10:28,260 --> 00:10:32,465 JEANENE URBAN: It would have been a total panic situation 193 00:10:32,531 --> 00:10:36,669 and realizing that they were out of options. 194 00:10:44,110 --> 00:10:46,912 OK, 2,400. 195 00:10:46,979 --> 00:10:49,849 NARRATOR: Rapidly losing electrical power 196 00:10:49,915 --> 00:10:54,220 and operating in total darkness, the pilots of Illinois flight 197 00:10:54,286 --> 00:10:58,858 710 desperately try to land their plane. 198 00:10:58,924 --> 00:11:01,727 DAVE MINTY: The conditions Carbondale were such 199 00:11:01,794 --> 00:11:03,629 that one mile visibility in light rain 200 00:11:03,696 --> 00:11:10,236 and fog, his chances of seeing anything were minimal at best. 201 00:11:10,302 --> 00:11:13,706 Do you have any instruments? 202 00:11:13,773 --> 00:11:14,607 Do you have a horizon? 203 00:11:17,843 --> 00:11:19,812 DAVE MINTY: They're in a dark cockpit. 204 00:11:19,879 --> 00:11:21,680 Instruments are failing. 205 00:11:21,747 --> 00:11:23,783 They can't see anything outside. 206 00:11:23,849 --> 00:11:26,585 They were now into a critical emergency. 207 00:11:26,652 --> 00:11:30,656 TUDOR: OK, you're banking left six degrees. 208 00:11:30,723 --> 00:11:32,892 OK, correcting to the right. 209 00:11:36,929 --> 00:11:37,963 A little more. 210 00:11:57,416 --> 00:12:01,287 Illinois 710, Kansas City, do you read? 211 00:12:01,353 --> 00:12:03,689 DAVE MINTY: I would be very surprised that they knew 212 00:12:03,756 --> 00:12:05,191 that they were going to hit. 213 00:12:05,257 --> 00:12:09,295 I would be very surprised they saw the ground at all. 214 00:12:09,361 --> 00:12:13,766 NARRATOR: Air Illinois flight 710 crashes 25 miles north 215 00:12:13,833 --> 00:12:14,867 of Carbondale airport. 216 00:12:17,903 --> 00:12:20,005 The wreckage is scattered across farmland 217 00:12:20,072 --> 00:12:23,709 near the town of Pinckneyville. 218 00:12:23,776 --> 00:12:26,645 All seven passengers and three crew members are dead. 219 00:12:32,451 --> 00:12:35,955 The National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB, 220 00:12:36,021 --> 00:12:38,090 begins an investigation to determine 221 00:12:38,157 --> 00:12:41,260 what happened to flight 710. 222 00:12:41,327 --> 00:12:45,164 Let's see what we got here. 223 00:12:45,231 --> 00:12:47,933 NARRATOR: They begin by reviewing the debris pattern. 224 00:12:53,205 --> 00:13:02,148 That's a half a mile long and roughly 200 feet wide. 225 00:13:02,214 --> 00:13:06,852 NARRATOR: Investigators get a sense of the vast impact area, 226 00:13:06,919 --> 00:13:09,388 which extends across two small wooded areas, 227 00:13:09,455 --> 00:13:11,724 a field, and a pond. 228 00:13:11,790 --> 00:13:13,859 They came in at a shallow angle. 229 00:13:13,926 --> 00:13:16,896 RON SCHLEEDE: The wreckage pattern gave us the idea 230 00:13:16,962 --> 00:13:20,900 that this was a fairly high speed, low angle 231 00:13:20,966 --> 00:13:23,202 impact to be able to spread the wreckage 232 00:13:23,269 --> 00:13:26,972 like this over a half a mile. 233 00:13:27,039 --> 00:13:31,310 First point of impact is right here with ground 234 00:13:31,377 --> 00:13:36,081 scars and debris heading north. 235 00:13:36,148 --> 00:13:40,386 Carbondale airport is 25 miles to the south. 236 00:13:40,452 --> 00:13:42,221 NARRATOR: Investigators determined 237 00:13:42,288 --> 00:13:44,390 that at the time of the crash, flight 238 00:13:44,456 --> 00:13:49,061 710 was flying in the opposite direction to its destination. 239 00:13:49,128 --> 00:13:52,231 ROBERT WATSON: With the aircraft traveling the way it was 240 00:13:52,298 --> 00:13:55,701 at that speed and in a wrong direction, 241 00:13:55,768 --> 00:13:58,370 it made us wonder was the aircraft actually 242 00:13:58,437 --> 00:13:59,905 under control. 243 00:13:59,972 --> 00:14:03,442 So first ground scar here followed by a few 244 00:14:03,509 --> 00:14:11,850 more and then 200 feet in front of that, the right wing tip. 245 00:14:11,917 --> 00:14:14,119 NARRATOR: Near the first impact marks, 246 00:14:14,186 --> 00:14:17,423 investigators discover fragments of a green navigation 247 00:14:17,489 --> 00:14:20,326 light from the plane's right wing tip. 248 00:14:20,392 --> 00:14:24,063 It was banked to the right when it hit the ground. 249 00:14:24,129 --> 00:14:26,098 RON SCHLEEDE: We had the right wing tip. 250 00:14:26,165 --> 00:14:28,767 We knew that was the first thing to hit the ground, 251 00:14:28,834 --> 00:14:32,104 and we could measure approximately 30 degree right 252 00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:34,173 bank. 253 00:14:34,240 --> 00:14:37,476 Did the crew report any issues to air traffic control? 254 00:14:37,543 --> 00:14:39,111 Yeah, they did. 255 00:14:42,248 --> 00:14:46,085 Springfield, Illinois 710, we have experienced 256 00:14:46,151 --> 00:14:48,254 a slight electrical problem. 257 00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:50,856 We'll keep you advised. 258 00:14:50,923 --> 00:14:54,393 NARRATOR: Investigators learned that 90 seconds after taking 259 00:14:54,460 --> 00:14:59,465 off from Springfield, the crew reported an electrical problem. 260 00:14:59,531 --> 00:15:01,367 Anything else? 261 00:15:01,433 --> 00:15:06,839 That's it, just the electrical problem. 262 00:15:06,905 --> 00:15:08,807 We'll need to take a good look at all 263 00:15:08,874 --> 00:15:10,776 the electrical components. 264 00:15:10,843 --> 00:15:14,813 RON SCHLEEDE: The pilot reported a slight electrical problem, 265 00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:18,817 and it was up to us to figure out what his problem was 266 00:15:18,884 --> 00:15:20,085 and why they crashed. 267 00:15:26,191 --> 00:15:28,327 Is this everything? 268 00:15:28,394 --> 00:15:31,363 NARRATOR: Investigators examine electrical components 269 00:15:31,430 --> 00:15:35,567 for evidence of malfunctions. 270 00:15:35,634 --> 00:15:37,436 The wires are clean. 271 00:15:37,503 --> 00:15:38,470 There's no short circuit. 272 00:15:45,044 --> 00:15:47,012 This inverter's in bad shape. 273 00:15:49,581 --> 00:15:52,017 Hard to tell if they were working or not. 274 00:15:54,520 --> 00:15:56,322 What about the batteries? 275 00:15:59,191 --> 00:16:03,996 NARRATOR: Four NiCad batteries are powered by two generators. 276 00:16:04,063 --> 00:16:08,967 Each battery contains 18 individual battery cells. 277 00:16:09,034 --> 00:16:14,073 No signs of arcing or short circuit as a result of impact. 278 00:16:14,139 --> 00:16:17,042 ROBERT WATSON: We were able to recover a total of 10 cells 279 00:16:17,109 --> 00:16:20,379 from the batteries, and they were all in decent shape. 280 00:16:20,446 --> 00:16:24,216 Well, let's see if they can hold a charge. 281 00:16:24,283 --> 00:16:26,018 NARRATOR: Under normal conditions, 282 00:16:26,085 --> 00:16:27,586 the battery should be fully charged. 283 00:16:30,522 --> 00:16:34,426 Wow, they're dead. 284 00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:36,929 ROBERT WATSON: The batters are able to hold a charge, 285 00:16:36,995 --> 00:16:41,633 but for some reason, they were run down. 286 00:16:41,700 --> 00:16:44,103 NARRATOR: Did the generators malfunction 287 00:16:44,169 --> 00:16:48,073 and fail to charge the batteries? 288 00:16:48,140 --> 00:16:51,910 Now the left generator. 289 00:16:51,977 --> 00:16:54,346 NARRATOR: Aircraft engines power a generator 290 00:16:54,413 --> 00:16:59,184 shaft to rotate a metal core wrapped in copper coil. 291 00:16:59,251 --> 00:17:02,221 This is known as an armature. 292 00:17:02,287 --> 00:17:05,391 The armature spins rapidly between the poles of a magnet 293 00:17:05,457 --> 00:17:07,159 to generate electricity. 294 00:17:10,662 --> 00:17:13,332 Banding wire's come off. 295 00:17:13,399 --> 00:17:15,534 NARRATOR: Banding wire is used to hold 296 00:17:15,601 --> 00:17:20,139 the armature together as it spins inside the assembly. 297 00:17:20,205 --> 00:17:23,375 If the banding wire comes loose, the armature could jam. 298 00:17:30,449 --> 00:17:34,586 The soldering is melted. 299 00:17:34,653 --> 00:17:37,990 The motor must have overheated. 300 00:17:38,056 --> 00:17:40,225 NARRATOR: Investigators discover evidence 301 00:17:40,292 --> 00:17:43,395 that the left generator failed. 302 00:17:43,462 --> 00:17:47,332 This happened before the crash. 303 00:17:47,399 --> 00:17:49,034 ROBERT WATSON: We know that there was 304 00:17:49,101 --> 00:17:53,272 no fire on the aircraft, so we believe that the solder 305 00:17:53,338 --> 00:17:55,107 melted due to internal heating. 306 00:17:55,174 --> 00:17:57,976 But we don't know why. 307 00:17:58,043 --> 00:18:01,413 NARRATOR: They then inspect the right generator. 308 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:05,451 Well, the banding wire's intact on this one. 309 00:18:05,517 --> 00:18:07,686 Looks fine. 310 00:18:07,753 --> 00:18:10,022 ROBERT WATSON: We did a resistance test, checked 311 00:18:10,088 --> 00:18:12,724 the brushes, and we looked at all the mechanical workings 312 00:18:12,791 --> 00:18:14,493 of the generator. 313 00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:17,162 We were not able to find any reason why the right generator 314 00:18:17,229 --> 00:18:19,398 would not charge the batteries. 315 00:18:19,465 --> 00:18:23,001 How did they crash with four working batteries 316 00:18:23,068 --> 00:18:25,337 and one working generator? 317 00:18:25,404 --> 00:18:28,173 RON SCHLEEDE: From examination of the wreckage, 318 00:18:28,240 --> 00:18:33,178 we were not able to find any reason for the accident. 319 00:18:33,245 --> 00:18:36,548 We were hoping that the voice recorder would give us clues 320 00:18:36,615 --> 00:18:38,050 as to what really happened. 321 00:18:45,824 --> 00:18:48,961 The recording starts around four minutes after takeoff. 322 00:18:51,663 --> 00:18:55,000 NARRATOR: Investigators turn to flight 710's cockpit voice 323 00:18:55,067 --> 00:18:57,202 recorder to determine how an aircraft 324 00:18:57,269 --> 00:19:00,072 with one functioning generator crashed 325 00:19:00,138 --> 00:19:01,840 short of its destination. 326 00:19:07,913 --> 00:19:10,048 Zero voltage and amps on the left side. 327 00:19:14,820 --> 00:19:17,823 Just like we suspected. 328 00:19:17,890 --> 00:19:20,359 NARRATOR: The CVR recording confirms 329 00:19:20,425 --> 00:19:25,163 that the left generator failed shortly after takeoff. 330 00:19:25,230 --> 00:19:29,234 The right generator's putting out 27.5 volts, 331 00:19:29,301 --> 00:19:32,738 but I can't get it to come online. 332 00:19:32,804 --> 00:19:34,907 NARRATOR: Investigators can't understand 333 00:19:34,973 --> 00:19:37,109 why the right generator was disconnected 334 00:19:37,175 --> 00:19:41,346 from the electrical system if it was operational. 335 00:19:41,413 --> 00:19:43,649 Then they hear an astonishing statement 336 00:19:43,715 --> 00:19:46,652 from the first officer to the captain. 337 00:19:46,718 --> 00:19:48,153 TUDOR: When we lost the left one, 338 00:19:48,220 --> 00:19:50,155 I reached up and shut off the right generator 339 00:19:50,222 --> 00:19:53,725 because I assumed the problem was the right side. 340 00:19:53,792 --> 00:19:55,193 Isolating it now. 341 00:19:57,829 --> 00:20:01,733 NARRATOR: There are two shutoff switches for the generators, 342 00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:05,771 one for the left generator and one for the right. 343 00:20:05,837 --> 00:20:08,006 The first officer disconnects the right one 344 00:20:08,073 --> 00:20:13,111 to protect the rest of the aircraft's electrical system, 345 00:20:13,178 --> 00:20:15,914 but he soon realizes that it's the left one that 346 00:20:15,981 --> 00:20:20,118 has the issue, not the right. 347 00:20:20,185 --> 00:20:23,722 Why doesn't he just reconnect it? 348 00:20:23,789 --> 00:20:26,725 He tries, but it doesn't work. 349 00:20:26,792 --> 00:20:28,260 ROBERT WATSON: The right generator 350 00:20:28,327 --> 00:20:30,929 was not charging the battery so that we know all they had 351 00:20:30,996 --> 00:20:34,299 to power the aircraft was the charge remaining on the battery 352 00:20:34,366 --> 00:20:36,735 shortly after takeoff. 353 00:20:36,802 --> 00:20:40,005 Maybe there was a problem with the switching unit? 354 00:20:40,072 --> 00:20:42,941 ROBERT WATSON: If the generator switching unit is not working, 355 00:20:43,008 --> 00:20:44,910 then the generator will not come back online. 356 00:20:44,977 --> 00:20:46,345 So we were quite interested in learning what 357 00:20:46,411 --> 00:20:47,913 we could about this component. 358 00:20:52,050 --> 00:20:54,386 It's in pretty rough shape. 359 00:20:54,453 --> 00:20:57,022 NARRATOR: Looking for signs of a malfunction, 360 00:20:57,089 --> 00:21:00,392 investigators examine the right generator control switch. 361 00:21:04,429 --> 00:21:07,466 I can't tell 100%. 362 00:21:07,532 --> 00:21:11,203 It's possible it failed before the crash. 363 00:21:11,269 --> 00:21:12,471 ROBERT WATSON: The switching unit was 364 00:21:12,537 --> 00:21:14,272 heavily damaged from the crash. 365 00:21:14,339 --> 00:21:17,409 We were not able to determine if that's even why the generator 366 00:21:17,476 --> 00:21:18,343 would not come online. 367 00:21:21,413 --> 00:21:24,950 Even if the switch was broken, it doesn't 368 00:21:25,017 --> 00:21:26,351 explain the pilot's actions. 369 00:21:29,354 --> 00:21:32,858 The first officer says I assumed the problem 370 00:21:32,924 --> 00:21:35,060 was with the right side. 371 00:21:35,127 --> 00:21:37,062 Why would he assume something like that? 372 00:21:37,129 --> 00:21:38,397 ROBERT WATSON: Made us wonder if there 373 00:21:38,463 --> 00:21:42,434 was a problem with that generator in the past. 374 00:21:42,501 --> 00:21:45,103 Take a look at these maintenance reports. 375 00:21:45,170 --> 00:21:47,072 NARRATOR: The team reviews the maintenance 376 00:21:47,139 --> 00:21:49,975 records for the Hawker Siddeley's generators. 377 00:21:50,042 --> 00:21:51,510 Check it out. 378 00:21:51,576 --> 00:21:53,912 No less than eight separate pilot complaints and repairs 379 00:21:53,979 --> 00:21:57,315 on the right generator. 380 00:21:57,382 --> 00:22:01,153 There were voltage fluctuations and recurring 381 00:22:01,219 --> 00:22:02,954 problems at the regulator. 382 00:22:03,021 --> 00:22:05,157 Causing the right generator shut down. 383 00:22:08,060 --> 00:22:10,328 NARRATOR: Two weeks before the crash, 384 00:22:10,395 --> 00:22:14,533 there were issues with a right generator almost every day. 385 00:22:14,599 --> 00:22:16,234 RON SCHLEEDE: They were doing maintenance, 386 00:22:16,301 --> 00:22:19,237 they were troubleshooting it, they were changing parts, 387 00:22:19,304 --> 00:22:21,306 and they couldn't fix it. 388 00:22:21,373 --> 00:22:24,376 Air Illinois had one Hawker Siddeley and three 389 00:22:24,443 --> 00:22:27,946 flight crews flying that plane. 390 00:22:28,013 --> 00:22:29,548 ROBERT WATSON: I'm sure that they all 391 00:22:29,614 --> 00:22:32,417 knew that the right generator had had problems in the past, 392 00:22:32,484 --> 00:22:33,518 and they probably all experienced 393 00:22:33,585 --> 00:22:36,021 it at one time or another. 394 00:22:36,088 --> 00:22:38,323 JEANENE URBAN: The first officer had 395 00:22:38,390 --> 00:22:41,326 been on some of those flights where the right generator 396 00:22:41,393 --> 00:22:44,329 had actually disconnected. 397 00:22:44,396 --> 00:22:46,498 Thank goodness I was not. 398 00:22:46,565 --> 00:22:50,268 The most I ever saw it do was flicker a time or two. 399 00:22:50,335 --> 00:22:53,071 That would explain why the first officer 400 00:22:53,138 --> 00:22:56,108 disconnected the right generator instead of the left one. 401 00:22:58,643 --> 00:23:00,612 NARRATOR: Investigators suspect that 402 00:23:00,679 --> 00:23:02,481 on the night of the crash-- 403 00:23:02,547 --> 00:23:04,950 It's the generator again. 404 00:23:05,016 --> 00:23:07,419 NARRATOR: The first officer made the immediate assumption 405 00:23:07,486 --> 00:23:11,890 that the right generator had malfunctioned. 406 00:23:11,957 --> 00:23:14,359 ROBERT WATSON: The reaction that the first officer had 407 00:23:14,426 --> 00:23:16,394 about taking the right generator offline 408 00:23:16,461 --> 00:23:20,632 probably falls into a phenomenon that's called expectation bias. 409 00:23:20,699 --> 00:23:23,535 He has experienced this in the past 410 00:23:23,602 --> 00:23:27,005 and assumed that that was going to be the problem 411 00:23:27,072 --> 00:23:29,141 without really looking at the indications 412 00:23:29,207 --> 00:23:30,976 they had available to him. 413 00:23:31,042 --> 00:23:34,112 Still doesn't explain the crash. 414 00:23:34,179 --> 00:23:37,415 NARRATOR: Even though both generators were offline, 415 00:23:37,482 --> 00:23:40,051 investigators know the aircraft's batteries 416 00:23:40,118 --> 00:23:42,254 were in working order. 417 00:23:42,320 --> 00:23:44,389 How are the batteries? 418 00:23:44,456 --> 00:23:46,424 Pretty good. 419 00:23:46,491 --> 00:23:49,394 They're at 21.5. 420 00:23:49,461 --> 00:23:51,463 Should last to Carbondale. 421 00:23:51,530 --> 00:23:52,998 Yeah. 422 00:23:53,064 --> 00:23:54,299 ROBERT WATSON: It was really important to know 423 00:23:54,366 --> 00:23:56,134 did the batteries have enough endurance 424 00:23:56,201 --> 00:23:57,169 to get to the airport. 425 00:24:04,142 --> 00:24:07,212 Let's see how they manage their battery power. 426 00:24:07,279 --> 00:24:10,649 NARRATOR: Investigators return to the cockpit voice recorder 427 00:24:10,715 --> 00:24:14,252 to determine why flight 710 ran out of battery power 428 00:24:14,319 --> 00:24:18,089 before reaching Carbondale. 429 00:24:18,156 --> 00:24:21,893 SMITH: How are the bats there? 430 00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:24,963 We're down to 22.5 volts. 431 00:24:25,030 --> 00:24:27,799 OK, beacons off. 432 00:24:27,866 --> 00:24:30,802 OK. 433 00:24:30,869 --> 00:24:33,605 SMITH: Nav lights are off. 434 00:24:33,672 --> 00:24:36,708 NARRATOR: Just minutes after discovering both generators 435 00:24:36,775 --> 00:24:40,145 are down, the pilots turn off nonessential systems 436 00:24:40,212 --> 00:24:41,713 to save their batteries. 437 00:24:44,349 --> 00:24:47,085 They were doing the right thing turning 438 00:24:47,152 --> 00:24:49,254 things off to reduce the load. 439 00:24:49,321 --> 00:24:50,722 But is it enough? 440 00:24:54,159 --> 00:24:56,795 According to the manufacturer, they needed to reduce 441 00:24:56,862 --> 00:24:59,598 their load to 70 amps. 442 00:24:59,664 --> 00:25:01,333 NARRATOR: Amps measure the strength 443 00:25:01,399 --> 00:25:03,001 of an electrical current. 444 00:25:03,068 --> 00:25:04,870 The more amps drawn on a battery, 445 00:25:04,936 --> 00:25:08,940 the faster the battery will discharge. 446 00:25:09,007 --> 00:25:11,610 ROBERT WATSON: If the crew would have reduced the load to 70 447 00:25:11,676 --> 00:25:13,211 amps, that would have given them a minimum 448 00:25:13,278 --> 00:25:15,180 of 30 minutes of endurance. 449 00:25:15,247 --> 00:25:17,215 That might have been enough time to get 450 00:25:17,282 --> 00:25:19,184 them to the Carbondale airport. 451 00:25:19,251 --> 00:25:23,889 Let's see if they got their load down to 70 amps. 452 00:25:23,955 --> 00:25:28,960 Well, we know they turned off the beacons, 453 00:25:29,027 --> 00:25:30,795 navigation lights-- 454 00:25:30,862 --> 00:25:34,065 NARRATOR: Investigators make an inventory of the instruments 455 00:25:34,132 --> 00:25:36,001 the crew turned off and what they 456 00:25:36,067 --> 00:25:41,273 left on in order to calculate the load on the batteries. 457 00:25:41,339 --> 00:25:44,743 What else? 458 00:25:44,809 --> 00:25:47,178 SMITH: Are you using these lights here? 459 00:25:47,245 --> 00:25:49,648 TUDOR: I'll get that one down. 460 00:25:49,714 --> 00:25:52,017 RON SCHLEEDE: We were not able to determine 461 00:25:52,083 --> 00:25:56,688 what was powered up or on or off based on the flight recorder. 462 00:25:56,755 --> 00:25:58,156 TUDOR: Should last the Carbondale. 463 00:25:58,223 --> 00:26:00,859 RON SCHLEEDE: So we had to rely on the conversations 464 00:26:00,926 --> 00:26:05,363 between the two pilots what to leave on and what to turn off. 465 00:26:05,430 --> 00:26:07,799 Want me to tune into cabby real quick? 466 00:26:07,866 --> 00:26:08,833 Sure. 467 00:26:08,900 --> 00:26:10,035 Not gonna use that much power. 468 00:26:13,338 --> 00:26:21,813 The DME instruments, weather radar, main cabin lights, one 469 00:26:21,880 --> 00:26:28,286 of the main radios, cooling fan, and the transponder. 470 00:26:28,353 --> 00:26:31,022 RON SCHLEEDE: The weather radar and the radios 471 00:26:31,089 --> 00:26:34,092 draw a lot of power, and so shedding those if you 472 00:26:34,159 --> 00:26:37,028 can is a prudent thing to do. 473 00:26:37,095 --> 00:26:39,197 Looks like they kept the rest of the flight instruments on 474 00:26:39,264 --> 00:26:40,799 and that's it. 475 00:26:46,304 --> 00:26:48,907 They used 110 amps. 476 00:26:48,974 --> 00:26:51,142 NARRATOR: Investigators discover the crew 477 00:26:51,209 --> 00:26:55,880 did not properly reduce the draw on their batteries. 478 00:26:55,947 --> 00:26:58,817 No wonder they didn't make it to Carbondale. 479 00:26:58,883 --> 00:27:01,152 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: This importance with load shedding 480 00:27:01,219 --> 00:27:05,690 and getting down to 70 amps seems to be lost on the crew 481 00:27:05,757 --> 00:27:08,360 as there seems to be no discussion whatsoever 482 00:27:08,426 --> 00:27:11,463 about amperage to determine if their changes 483 00:27:11,529 --> 00:27:13,431 in the electrical system were actually 484 00:27:13,498 --> 00:27:18,336 making a difference in the longevity of the batteries. 485 00:27:18,403 --> 00:27:21,840 NARRATOR: So why did the pilots believe they had enough power 486 00:27:21,906 --> 00:27:25,410 to reach their destination? 487 00:27:25,477 --> 00:27:28,279 The team checks to see how the pilots monitored 488 00:27:28,346 --> 00:27:30,415 the state of their batteries. 489 00:27:30,482 --> 00:27:35,086 It says here fully charged, the batteries are 24 volts. 490 00:27:35,153 --> 00:27:36,421 Let's see how they did. 491 00:27:40,859 --> 00:27:42,360 SMITH: How are the bats there? 492 00:27:45,063 --> 00:27:49,734 We're down to 22.5 volts. 493 00:27:49,801 --> 00:27:53,405 Eight minutes into the flight, they used up 1.5 volts. 494 00:27:57,275 --> 00:27:59,744 Seven minutes later-- 495 00:27:59,811 --> 00:28:02,247 SMITH: How are the batteries? 496 00:28:02,313 --> 00:28:04,249 Pretty good. 497 00:28:04,315 --> 00:28:06,151 We're at 21.5. 498 00:28:06,217 --> 00:28:14,492 The battery charge drops another volt to 21.5. 499 00:28:14,559 --> 00:28:16,895 The first officer says the battery 500 00:28:16,961 --> 00:28:20,131 should last to Carbondale. 501 00:28:20,198 --> 00:28:23,101 They're halfway through the flight, he's feeling good. 502 00:28:23,168 --> 00:28:26,204 And then nine minutes later, he checks again. 503 00:28:26,271 --> 00:28:27,138 It's 20 volts. 504 00:28:33,878 --> 00:28:36,381 So they think they're doing all right. 505 00:28:36,448 --> 00:28:39,017 And then minutes later, the radios go dead. 506 00:28:43,354 --> 00:28:47,092 We're losing everything down to 13 volts. 507 00:28:47,158 --> 00:28:50,361 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: They're talking about having 20 volts, 508 00:28:50,428 --> 00:28:53,998 and then they all of a sudden, they have 13 volts. 509 00:28:54,065 --> 00:28:56,167 So they're monitoring the volts, 510 00:28:56,234 --> 00:28:59,204 but it's as if the sudden drop caught them by surprise. 511 00:28:59,270 --> 00:29:01,372 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: The reason this is significant is 512 00:29:01,439 --> 00:29:04,375 because NiCad batteries will maintain 513 00:29:04,442 --> 00:29:07,378 their voltage almost right until the end 514 00:29:07,445 --> 00:29:09,247 that the batteries are dead. 515 00:29:09,314 --> 00:29:11,883 Much different than lead acid type 516 00:29:11,950 --> 00:29:13,551 batteries, which is where you see 517 00:29:13,618 --> 00:29:18,089 a gradual decline in voltage. 518 00:29:18,156 --> 00:29:21,092 NARRATOR: That characteristic of NiCad batteries 519 00:29:21,159 --> 00:29:23,528 may explain why there was such a sudden drop 520 00:29:23,595 --> 00:29:26,498 in the battery voltage. 521 00:29:26,564 --> 00:29:30,001 I don't know if we have enough juice to get out of this. 522 00:29:30,068 --> 00:29:32,504 ROBERT WATSON: If they would have known the characteristic 523 00:29:32,570 --> 00:29:35,373 of a NiCad battery, it might have sent them a message 524 00:29:35,440 --> 00:29:37,008 saying we better get on this right 525 00:29:37,075 --> 00:29:40,011 away and get this load reduced. 526 00:29:40,078 --> 00:29:42,313 NARRATOR: Investigators find another reason why 527 00:29:42,380 --> 00:29:44,883 the crew may have missed how fast their batteries were 528 00:29:44,949 --> 00:29:46,885 discharging. 529 00:29:46,951 --> 00:29:50,588 They never mentioned their amps. 530 00:29:50,655 --> 00:29:54,492 Looks like the only thing they monitored were the volts. 531 00:29:54,559 --> 00:29:57,929 NARRATOR: Volts measure the potential output of a battery, 532 00:29:57,996 --> 00:30:00,198 not how long it will last. 533 00:30:00,265 --> 00:30:04,035 Amps tell you how much electricity is being drawn. 534 00:30:04,102 --> 00:30:06,037 ROBERT WATSON: It was very surprising that they weren't 535 00:30:06,104 --> 00:30:07,605 monitoring the amperage because that 536 00:30:07,672 --> 00:30:09,874 was going to tell them how much longer they 537 00:30:09,941 --> 00:30:12,010 had on the batteries. 538 00:30:12,076 --> 00:30:15,180 NARRATOR: Did the crew have the proper training to monitor 539 00:30:15,246 --> 00:30:17,115 the endurance of the batteries? 540 00:30:22,554 --> 00:30:25,890 Investigators interview other Air Illinois pilots-- 541 00:30:25,957 --> 00:30:27,192 So what'd you find out. 542 00:30:27,258 --> 00:30:28,960 NARRATOR: To determine their ability 543 00:30:29,027 --> 00:30:34,098 to monitor and calculate battery endurance. 544 00:30:34,165 --> 00:30:37,902 Well, we know that they're all trained on battery management 545 00:30:37,969 --> 00:30:39,904 for a dual generator problem. 546 00:30:39,971 --> 00:30:43,942 But when I asked them how long they thought the batteries 547 00:30:44,008 --> 00:30:48,479 would have lasted on the flight, some calculated 30 minutes, 548 00:30:48,546 --> 00:30:51,983 others less than an hour. 549 00:30:52,050 --> 00:30:55,053 Five pilots gave us five different answers, 550 00:30:55,119 --> 00:30:57,922 and they were not all correct. 551 00:30:57,989 --> 00:30:59,390 ROBERT WATSON: It became obvious to us 552 00:30:59,457 --> 00:31:02,260 there was definitely a training issue involved here. 553 00:31:02,327 --> 00:31:05,296 Are you using these lights here? 554 00:31:05,363 --> 00:31:07,632 I'll get that one down. 555 00:31:07,699 --> 00:31:11,269 NARRATOR: The lack of training explains why the pilots thought 556 00:31:11,336 --> 00:31:14,973 they had enough power to reach Carbondale, 557 00:31:15,039 --> 00:31:17,108 but that doesn't solve a bigger mystery. 558 00:31:20,445 --> 00:31:21,946 This is their flight path. 559 00:31:22,013 --> 00:31:24,515 NARRATOR: Why didn't the pilots land the pain 560 00:31:24,582 --> 00:31:26,551 at another airport before completely 561 00:31:26,618 --> 00:31:28,519 running out of battery power? 562 00:31:28,586 --> 00:31:34,692 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 different airports. 563 00:31:34,759 --> 00:31:37,195 They were only five minutes away from Springfield, 564 00:31:37,262 --> 00:31:40,431 yet they elected to go 40 minutes to Carbondale. 565 00:31:40,498 --> 00:31:44,035 And there were several airports in between that they missed. 566 00:31:44,102 --> 00:31:46,704 They could have landed any time along the way. 567 00:31:46,771 --> 00:31:49,140 NARRATOR: Their decision not to land 568 00:31:49,207 --> 00:31:53,144 calls the pilots' judgment into question. 569 00:31:53,211 --> 00:31:55,480 It's time to look into their backgrounds. 570 00:32:04,355 --> 00:32:06,858 Here's the captain's file. 571 00:32:06,924 --> 00:32:10,561 NARRATOR: Investigators dig into the backgrounds of flight 710's 572 00:32:10,628 --> 00:32:13,731 pilots for clues that explain their unusual reaction 573 00:32:13,798 --> 00:32:14,932 to an electrical failure. 574 00:32:18,303 --> 00:32:21,739 The captain was perfectly qualified. 575 00:32:21,806 --> 00:32:25,243 Same with the FO. 576 00:32:25,310 --> 00:32:26,978 Gear up. 577 00:32:27,045 --> 00:32:29,614 NARRATOR: The two pilots were among the most experienced 578 00:32:29,681 --> 00:32:31,182 flight crew in the roster-- 579 00:32:31,249 --> 00:32:32,917 Gear is up. 580 00:32:32,984 --> 00:32:35,720 NARRATOR: With a combined 5,000 flying hours between them 581 00:32:35,787 --> 00:32:36,688 on the Hawker Siddeley. 582 00:32:39,424 --> 00:32:41,859 Here's something. 583 00:32:41,926 --> 00:32:44,996 The captain lived in Carbondale. 584 00:32:45,063 --> 00:32:47,598 Maybe he wanted to get home. 585 00:32:47,665 --> 00:32:49,367 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: In aviation, what we 586 00:32:49,434 --> 00:32:53,871 describe as get home itis is when we try to make it 587 00:32:53,938 --> 00:32:58,042 to the destination because of our strong desire to do so, 588 00:32:58,109 --> 00:33:02,747 and it plays a significant role in our decision making. 589 00:33:02,814 --> 00:33:05,149 NARRATOR: Investigators talk to other pilots 590 00:33:05,216 --> 00:33:09,687 at the company including first officer Jeanene Urban. 591 00:33:09,754 --> 00:33:13,057 How well did you know the pilots? 592 00:33:13,124 --> 00:33:15,760 I flew with the captain, and I was good friends 593 00:33:15,827 --> 00:33:16,728 with the first officer. 594 00:33:19,163 --> 00:33:21,799 JEANENE URBAN: I thought very highly 595 00:33:21,866 --> 00:33:24,402 of the first officer Frank. 596 00:33:24,469 --> 00:33:30,241 I knew the flight attendant Barbie and liked her a lot. 597 00:33:30,308 --> 00:33:34,645 It was a very emotional thing to hear that both of them 598 00:33:34,712 --> 00:33:37,115 had been killed. 599 00:33:37,181 --> 00:33:40,718 What sort of pilot was the captain? 600 00:33:40,785 --> 00:33:43,855 I'd say average. 601 00:33:43,921 --> 00:33:46,224 ROBERT WATSON: In the aviation community, when someone is 602 00:33:46,290 --> 00:33:48,192 characterized as an average pilot, 603 00:33:48,259 --> 00:33:51,295 that usually means he's not too good. 604 00:33:51,362 --> 00:33:53,364 Why is that? 605 00:33:53,431 --> 00:33:55,266 The captain really prided himself 606 00:33:55,333 --> 00:33:57,268 on getting there on time. 607 00:33:57,335 --> 00:34:02,039 JEANENE URBAN: It was not uncommon for him to take risks. 608 00:34:04,742 --> 00:34:06,344 Looks like we've got some weather. 609 00:34:06,411 --> 00:34:08,446 Shall I call for deviation? 610 00:34:08,513 --> 00:34:11,249 SMITH: Doesn't look too bad. 611 00:34:11,315 --> 00:34:12,150 We'll be fine. 612 00:34:14,852 --> 00:34:17,221 NARRATOR: According to Air Illinois pilots, 613 00:34:17,288 --> 00:34:19,791 the captain would often fly too close 614 00:34:19,857 --> 00:34:22,794 or through dangerous storms to save flight time. 615 00:34:25,763 --> 00:34:31,969 JEANENE URBAN: If I made any comments or suggestions 616 00:34:32,036 --> 00:34:35,773 about a safety issue like the thunderstorms or anything else, 617 00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:40,211 he would do something spiteful just to prove 618 00:34:40,278 --> 00:34:42,713 that he was the captain. 619 00:34:42,780 --> 00:34:46,050 In order to keep schedule, he'd also speed up, which would 620 00:34:46,117 --> 00:34:48,986 set off the overspeed alarm. 621 00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,458 Pull the circuit breaker, would you? 622 00:34:53,524 --> 00:34:55,193 What? 623 00:34:55,259 --> 00:34:57,128 Really? 624 00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,896 NARRATOR: Pilots said he would order 625 00:34:58,963 --> 00:35:01,232 them to disable the overspeed warning 626 00:35:01,299 --> 00:35:04,836 so that they could fly faster. 627 00:35:04,902 --> 00:35:09,774 It was always about getting there faster. 628 00:35:09,841 --> 00:35:14,445 NARRATOR: The captain's behavior is troublesome. 629 00:35:14,512 --> 00:35:18,082 RON SCHLEEDE: We wanted to know if the company, the airline, 630 00:35:18,149 --> 00:35:20,751 was putting undue pressure on the pilots 631 00:35:20,818 --> 00:35:22,420 to make the schedule. 632 00:35:22,487 --> 00:35:26,757 This pressure to get there on time, was it from management? 633 00:35:26,824 --> 00:35:28,025 No. 634 00:35:28,092 --> 00:35:29,927 It was all the captain. 635 00:35:29,994 --> 00:35:31,496 The interviews with the other pilots 636 00:35:31,562 --> 00:35:34,198 indicated that there was no undue pressure 637 00:35:34,265 --> 00:35:36,067 to skirt the rules. 638 00:35:36,133 --> 00:35:39,537 In the case of the captain, that pressure was self imposed. 639 00:35:39,604 --> 00:35:42,773 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that Captain Smith 640 00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:44,842 often stretched the rules. 641 00:35:44,909 --> 00:35:46,310 And what about the first officer? 642 00:35:50,181 --> 00:35:54,252 Frank was the best. 643 00:35:54,318 --> 00:35:58,189 And he knew the plane and its systems really well. 644 00:35:58,256 --> 00:36:00,291 NARRATOR: So why didn't the first officer 645 00:36:00,358 --> 00:36:04,795 speak up when Captain Smith made the decision to carry on. 646 00:36:04,862 --> 00:36:06,831 DISPATCH: Air Illinois 710, do you intend 647 00:36:06,898 --> 00:36:08,299 to return to Springfield? 648 00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:13,271 Negative continuing to Carbondale, 3,000 feet. 649 00:36:13,337 --> 00:36:14,972 ROBERT WATSON: And at no time did 650 00:36:15,039 --> 00:36:16,908 we hear the first officer challenge 651 00:36:16,974 --> 00:36:18,843 the captain's decision to go on to Carbondale. 652 00:36:18,910 --> 00:36:20,411 We found this very perplexing. 653 00:36:20,478 --> 00:36:22,547 I asked how he could fly with the captain 654 00:36:22,613 --> 00:36:25,082 because he took so many chances-- 655 00:36:25,149 --> 00:36:29,020 JEANENE URBAN: And he said, oh, I just 656 00:36:29,086 --> 00:36:31,322 try to keep an eye on the situation 657 00:36:31,389 --> 00:36:33,291 and not let him get us into anything 658 00:36:33,357 --> 00:36:35,359 that I can't get us out of. 659 00:36:35,426 --> 00:36:38,262 We're losing everything down to 13 volts. 660 00:36:38,329 --> 00:36:40,932 Watch my altitude, Frank. 661 00:36:40,998 --> 00:36:44,335 JEANENE URBAN: Boy, that didn't work out very well at all. 662 00:36:44,402 --> 00:36:46,437 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: The captain should have made the decision 663 00:36:46,504 --> 00:36:50,341 to return to the Springfield airport, and if so none of this 664 00:36:50,408 --> 00:36:51,275 would have happened. 665 00:36:54,211 --> 00:36:56,280 Thank you. 666 00:36:56,347 --> 00:37:00,051 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the risk-taking captain 667 00:37:00,117 --> 00:37:05,590 and an unassertive first officer was a dangerous combination. 668 00:37:05,656 --> 00:37:07,992 Let's pick it up from where they 669 00:37:08,059 --> 00:37:11,228 realize they don't have enough power to make it to Carbondale. 670 00:37:11,295 --> 00:37:15,466 NARRATOR: The team returns to the cockpit voice recording 671 00:37:15,533 --> 00:37:18,069 to see if they can uncover why the plain 672 00:37:18,135 --> 00:37:21,372 ended up so far off course. 673 00:37:21,439 --> 00:37:23,140 SMITH (ON RECORDING): Watch my altitude. 674 00:37:23,207 --> 00:37:25,977 Going down to 2,400 feet. 675 00:37:26,043 --> 00:37:28,913 OK. 676 00:37:28,980 --> 00:37:31,482 Stop the tape. 677 00:37:31,549 --> 00:37:38,889 Why would the captain decide to drop down to 2,400 feet? 678 00:37:38,956 --> 00:37:41,392 The cloud ceiling near Carbondale 679 00:37:41,459 --> 00:37:44,395 was almost 2,000 feet, so maybe he 680 00:37:44,462 --> 00:37:46,063 was popping in and out of the clouds 681 00:37:46,130 --> 00:37:49,266 to see something on the ground. 682 00:37:49,333 --> 00:37:50,167 Play on. 683 00:37:53,971 --> 00:37:55,272 SMITH (ON RECORDING): You got a flashlight? 684 00:37:55,339 --> 00:37:58,342 Yeah. 685 00:37:58,409 --> 00:37:59,377 Here we go. 686 00:37:59,443 --> 00:38:01,345 You want to shine it up here. 687 00:38:01,412 --> 00:38:05,082 NARRATOR: Just as the captain tries to see the ground, 688 00:38:05,149 --> 00:38:08,152 the cockpit lights go out and plunge 689 00:38:08,219 --> 00:38:10,221 them into total darkness. 690 00:38:10,287 --> 00:38:12,556 We're losing everything down to 13 volts. 691 00:38:15,192 --> 00:38:16,594 Watch my altitude, Frank. 692 00:38:19,697 --> 00:38:25,102 OK, 2,400. 693 00:38:25,169 --> 00:38:28,139 They make it to 2,400 feet. 694 00:38:28,205 --> 00:38:31,575 The captain plans to level off, spot the runway, 695 00:38:31,642 --> 00:38:34,679 and continue his descent. 696 00:38:34,745 --> 00:38:37,148 But that's not what happens. 697 00:38:37,214 --> 00:38:41,419 OK, you're banking left, six degrees. 698 00:38:41,485 --> 00:38:43,721 OK, correcting to the right. 699 00:38:43,788 --> 00:38:45,289 ROBERT WATSON: Just minutes later 700 00:38:45,356 --> 00:38:47,124 they ended up crashing in completely 701 00:38:47,191 --> 00:38:48,059 the opposite direction. 702 00:38:48,125 --> 00:38:49,727 A little more. 703 00:38:49,794 --> 00:38:53,631 So the question is what happened. 704 00:38:59,670 --> 00:39:01,539 How do you go from leveling off 705 00:39:01,605 --> 00:39:04,375 at 2,400 feet to then hitting the ground 706 00:39:04,442 --> 00:39:07,011 in the opposite direction? 707 00:39:07,078 --> 00:39:11,649 NARRATOR: Investigators examine the final moments of flight 710 708 00:39:11,716 --> 00:39:15,252 to determine what ultimately brought the plane down. 709 00:39:15,319 --> 00:39:16,721 How does the recording end? 710 00:39:25,629 --> 00:39:28,265 NARRATOR: The recording eerily slows down. 711 00:39:32,636 --> 00:39:36,407 And then silence. 712 00:39:36,474 --> 00:39:37,775 Their batteries just died. 713 00:39:43,114 --> 00:39:45,783 NARRATOR: The captain is asking for a horizon reading 714 00:39:45,850 --> 00:39:48,686 on the attitude directional indicator or ADI. 715 00:39:51,522 --> 00:39:54,725 The ADI uses an electrically-powered gyroscope 716 00:39:54,792 --> 00:39:58,162 to indicate the aircraft's pitch and roll relative 717 00:39:58,229 --> 00:40:01,065 to the Earth's horizon. 718 00:40:01,132 --> 00:40:02,666 SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: It's nighttime, 719 00:40:02,733 --> 00:40:06,470 no discernible horizon, low visibility. 720 00:40:06,537 --> 00:40:10,207 Your ADI is everything that you need to be able to keep 721 00:40:10,274 --> 00:40:12,643 the airplane wings level. 722 00:40:12,710 --> 00:40:17,047 They've lost the lights on their instruments. 723 00:40:17,114 --> 00:40:21,418 Some of them are starting to fail. 724 00:40:21,485 --> 00:40:25,322 He asked the first officer to shine a light on their ADI. 725 00:40:28,292 --> 00:40:32,163 TUDOR: OK, you're banking left, six degrees. 726 00:40:32,229 --> 00:40:35,199 OK, correcting to the right. 727 00:40:35,266 --> 00:40:39,303 NARRATOR: Investigators can only surmise what happened next. 728 00:40:39,370 --> 00:40:41,639 Even if all the instruments had failed, 729 00:40:41,705 --> 00:40:46,143 the ADI would still look like it's working. 730 00:40:46,210 --> 00:40:51,749 NARRATOR: The ADI gyroscope spins at about 15,000 RPM. 731 00:40:51,816 --> 00:40:54,652 Even after the power shuts down, it will continue 732 00:40:54,718 --> 00:40:57,421 rotating for several minutes. 733 00:40:57,488 --> 00:41:01,292 So it looks like it's working, but it really is not. 734 00:41:01,358 --> 00:41:06,697 NARRATOR: As the ADI winds down, it slowly tilts to one side. 735 00:41:06,764 --> 00:41:13,771 Imagine that ADI starts slowly falling to the left. 736 00:41:13,838 --> 00:41:16,340 They correct by rolling to the right. 737 00:41:18,809 --> 00:41:23,147 OK, you're banking left six degrees. 738 00:41:23,214 --> 00:41:24,815 OK, correcting to the right. 739 00:41:27,751 --> 00:41:30,487 A little more. 740 00:41:30,554 --> 00:41:32,590 ROBERT WATSON: It may have appeared to them that the ADI 741 00:41:32,656 --> 00:41:34,358 was working correctly, but they're 742 00:41:34,425 --> 00:41:38,195 really banking to the right and losing altitude. 743 00:41:38,262 --> 00:41:40,364 They probably followed that failing 744 00:41:40,431 --> 00:41:43,567 ADI right into the ground. 745 00:41:46,237 --> 00:41:47,638 RON SCHLEEDE: They couldn't see where they were, 746 00:41:47,705 --> 00:41:50,140 they couldn't see any lights, and it 747 00:41:50,207 --> 00:41:51,242 would be over in an instant. 748 00:42:05,689 --> 00:42:08,559 NARRATOR: In their final report, investigators 749 00:42:08,626 --> 00:42:11,495 conclude that the fatal accident was a consequence 750 00:42:11,562 --> 00:42:14,198 of a captain's decision to continue the flight 751 00:42:14,265 --> 00:42:16,767 toward Carbondale instead of returning 752 00:42:16,834 --> 00:42:20,804 to the nearby departure airport after the loss of power. 753 00:42:20,871 --> 00:42:22,539 RON SCHLEEDE: The cause of this accident 754 00:42:22,606 --> 00:42:25,809 was not a catastrophic failure that suddenly 755 00:42:25,876 --> 00:42:27,811 caused the airplane to crash. 756 00:42:27,878 --> 00:42:30,314 It was the decision by the captain 757 00:42:30,381 --> 00:42:33,217 to continue flight on battery power 758 00:42:33,284 --> 00:42:35,920 after they lost the generators. 759 00:42:35,986 --> 00:42:37,888 NARRATOR: Also adding to the problem 760 00:42:37,955 --> 00:42:42,660 was a lack of crew resource management or CRM. 761 00:42:42,726 --> 00:42:46,964 RON SCHLEEDE: Now part of crew resource management training 762 00:42:47,031 --> 00:42:51,335 is that crews are trained to act as a team, 763 00:42:51,402 --> 00:42:54,638 and first officers are taught and encouraged 764 00:42:54,705 --> 00:42:58,309 to question the captain's decision making and actions 765 00:42:58,375 --> 00:43:00,511 if they do not agree. 766 00:43:00,577 --> 00:43:01,845 JEANENE URBAN: Speak up. 767 00:43:01,912 --> 00:43:04,782 Don't worry about if it upsets somebody's ego. 768 00:43:04,848 --> 00:43:07,618 It's not worth dying over. 769 00:43:07,685 --> 00:43:10,287 NARRATOR: Investigators cite inadequate crew 770 00:43:10,354 --> 00:43:12,489 training to assess battery endurance 771 00:43:12,556 --> 00:43:15,559 as another contributing factor. 772 00:43:15,626 --> 00:43:16,627 RON SCHLEEDE: It should have been 773 00:43:16,694 --> 00:43:18,429 discussed in their training. 774 00:43:18,495 --> 00:43:20,864 It should have been in their training materials 775 00:43:20,931 --> 00:43:23,000 and in the flight manual. 776 00:43:23,067 --> 00:43:25,436 NARRATOR: As a result of this accident, 777 00:43:25,502 --> 00:43:29,673 the NTSB also recommends independently powered ADIs 778 00:43:29,740 --> 00:43:32,242 on all transport airplanes. 779 00:43:32,309 --> 00:43:34,378 ROBERT WATSON: So that if all power was lost, 780 00:43:34,445 --> 00:43:36,714 they still had the ability to keep the airplane straight and 781 00:43:36,780 --> 00:43:39,283 level for at least 30 minutes. 782 00:43:39,350 --> 00:43:46,323 NARRATOR: This recommendation was implemented in 1997. 783 00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:48,759 Flight 710 brought national attention 784 00:43:48,826 --> 00:43:53,864 and increased scrutiny of small commuter airlines. 785 00:43:53,931 --> 00:43:56,834 Six months after the accident, Air Illinois 786 00:43:56,900 --> 00:43:59,837 filed for bankruptcy and ceased operations. 787 00:43:59,903 --> 00:44:04,008 DAVE MINTY: It's something where we learn by our mistakes. 788 00:44:04,074 --> 00:44:07,845 The first priority is the safety of the passengers is got to be 789 00:44:07,911 --> 00:44:10,547 the most important factor.